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EXCLUSION OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC FROM
A CRIMINAL TRIAL-SOME PROBLEM AREAS
This note presents the legal problems which arise when the general public
is excluded from a criminal trial.' Exclusion of the press from a criminal
trial is dealt with only to the extent that the press is considered, as modern
courts have done,2 to be but one segment of the "public." The issues to be
1. Exclusions of the public from non-criminal trials are beyond the scope of this note.
For instance, juvenile court proceedings are not "criminal trials." In re Holmes, 379 Pa.
599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955); Dendy v. Wilson, 142
Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944); In re Lewis, 51 Wash. 2d 193, 316 P.2d 907 (1957).
Further, there are certain types of civil cases from which the public is normally excluded
in accordance with statutory provision. These include cases involving divorce, seduction,
breach of promise of marriage, slander, annulment, bastardy, adoption, and hospitalization
of the mentally ill. For a fuller discussion see 6 WboIonRE, EVMENCE § 1835 (3d cd.
1940).
Exclusion of the general public has also been upheld in civil cases involving the
disclosure of trade secrets. See E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland,
244 U.S. 100, 103 (1917); National Starch Prods., Inc. v. Polymer Indus., Inc., 273
App. Div. 732, 79 N.Y.S.2d 357, leave to appeal denied, 274 App. Div. 822, 81 N.Y.S.2d
278 (1948). But if these trials were criminal rather than civil, such as in the case of
a criminal anti-trust violation, it is doubtful that a general exclusion order would be
sustained. See United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 159 F. Supp. 860
(S.D.N.Y. 1958), appeal dismissed, 266 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1959); Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, 26 Stat. 209-10 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964); 37 Stat. 731 (1913), 15 U.S.C.
§ 30 (1964).
2. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Kirtowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App.
2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956) ; State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 163, 203 A.2d 1, 9 (1964)
(by implication); United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954);
E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896, appeal dismissed per
curiam, 164 Ohio St. 261, 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955); accord, Tribune Review Publishing
Co. v. Thomas, 153 F. Supp. 486 (W. D. Pa. 1957), aff'd, 254 F.2d 883 ( (3rd Cir.
1958) ; see Geise v United States, 265 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842
(1959); Bonicelli v. State, 339 P.2d 1063 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959). But see Lyles v.
State, 330 P.2d 734 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958); Commonwealth ex rel. Paylor v. Cavell,
185 Pa. Super. 176, 182, 138 A.2d 246, 249, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 854 (1958). In
Lyles v. State, supra at 740, the court stated:
The doors of our courts must never be closed for Star Chamber sessions. They
must be open to the press and its prying eyes andpurifying pen to report courtroom
abuses... which despoil and stagnate the flow of equal and exact justice. In fact,
it has been held the right of a public trial is abridged [per se] if the press is ex-
cluded .... [But the court goes on to say that] " 'no freedoms are absolute.' The
freedoms of speech and press are not exceptions .... If at any time the representa-
tives of the 'press' . . . interfere with the orderly conduct of court procedure, . ..
the court has the inherent power to put an immediate stop to such conduct."
(Citations omitted.)
The special problems relating to the freedom of the press are also beyond the scope of
this note, but for a reasonable approach to some of these problems see 19 F.R.D. 16
(1955) (panel discussion). See also A Free Press and a Fair Trial-A Symposium, 11
ViLL. L. REv. 677 (1966).
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resolved are: (1) What is the basis for a public trial? (2) When and why
has the general public been excluded from a criminal trial? (3) Are the
reasons propounded for excluding the public valid when applied to specific
factual situations? (4) How much discretion do trial judges have to exclude
the public or segments thereof? (5) What is the present trend in American
case law concerning the exclusion of the public from criminal trials?
In countries where the people have had an effective voice in their govern-
ment, the administration of justice in secret seems to have been without
legal foundation.' English jurisprudence was undoubtedly influenced at
least to some extent by the open tribunals of Rome.' Though it is uncertain
when English courts first required open attendance, the right to a public
trial is firmly rooted in our common law heritage.' In fact, some courts
have held that the right to a public trial is a right inherent in the common
law and would exist even in the absence of legislative or constitutional sanc-
tion.' Underlying this heritage is a fundamental distrust of "justice" admin-
istered in private:
The traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials has been
variously ascribed to the notorious use of this practice by the Spanish
Inquisition, to the excesses of the English Court of Star Chamber, and
to the French Monarchy's abuse of the lettre de cachet. (Footnotes
omitted.)7
The sixth amendment to the Constitution provides, "In all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." Each
state, except one, has a similar guarantee by constitution, statute, or de-
cision.' The precise question of whether the public trial guarantee of the
sixth amendment is obligatory on the states through the fourteenth amend-
mend has never been passed on by the Court in a meaningful way.9 The
3. See E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 161, 125 N.E.2d 896, 900,
appeal dismissed per curiam, 164 Ohio St. 261, 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
4. Ibid.
5. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948).
6. E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 161-62, 125 N.E.2d 896, 900,
appeal dismissed per curiam, 164 Ohio St. 261, 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955); State v. Holm,
67 Wyo. 360, 384, 224 P.2d 500, 508 (1950); see Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91
Atd. 417 (1914) ; State v. Copp, 15 N.H. 212 (1844).
7. In re Oliver 333 U.S. 257, 268-69 (1948). For a fuller discussion of the history
of the right to a public trial see In re Oliver, supra, at 269-72 nn.21-30; E. W. Scripps
Co. v. Fulton, supra note 6; CROSs, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW 153-75 (1953);
6 WIOMORE, EVMENCE § 1834 (3d ed. 1940); WIGGINS, THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO PUBLIC
TRIAL, 19 F.R.D. 16, 25-36 (1955). For the view that there is no historical or any other
rational basis for the right to a public trial see Radin, The Right to a Public Trial,
6 TMP. L.Q. 381 (1932).
8. There are forty-three state constitutional provisions for the right to a public trial.
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Supreme Court in In re Oliver' has held that a completely secret trial in
a state court violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court has similarly reversed convictions which were based on trials
that were too public."
See In re Oliver, supra note 7; ALASKA CONST. art I, § 11; HAWAII CONST. art. I, §
11. These last two states construe their constitutional provisions for a public trial in sub-
stantially the same manner as the federal courts construe the sixth amendment of the
federal constitution. See Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 222 (Alaska), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 859 (1964); State v. Hashimoto, 47 Hawaii 185, 389 P.2d 146 (1963).
Two states provide for the right to a public trial by statute. Nnv. REV. STAT. §
169.160 (1957); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 12. Three other states recognize the right by
decision. Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 387, 91 Ad. 417, 422 (1914) (no secret trials);
State v. Copp, 15 N.H. 212, 215 (1844) (dictum); State v. Holm, 67 Wyo. 360, 384,
224 P.2d 500, 508 (1950) (common law rule).
Massachusetts recognizes the right to a public trial indirectly because of a statute
which allows exclusion only in specific classes of sex cases-victim under age eighteen,
bastardy, or seduction. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 278, § 16 (1956). This statute has been
strictly limited to these types of cases. See Commonwealth v. Blondin, 324 Mass. 564,
87 N.E.2d 455 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 984 (1950). Virginia seems to be the
only state where the accused has no recognized right to a public trial. See In re Oliver,
supra note 7; VA. CONST. art. 1, § 8; VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-246 (1950).
9. See Quick, A Public Criminal Trial, 60 Dic. L. Rav. 21, 23 (1955). Contra,
4 CATHoLIc U.L. REv. 38 (1954).
10. 333 U.S. 257 (1948). The Oliver case was expressly limited to its peculiar facts-
Michigan's unique one-man grand jury system. See id. at 273. However, in view of re-
cent cases and the present composition of the Court, there is little doubt that the
public trial provision of the sixth amendment would be made mandatory upon the
states in the proper case. United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 246 F. Supp. 363, 367
(N.D.N.Y. 1965); see Klopfer v. North Carolina, 87 Sup. Ct. 988 (1967); Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 588-89 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
Oliver appears to do no more than prohibit secret trials. A "non-secret" rule provides a
minimal definition of "publicness," but in terms of their diverse criminal systems, this
leaves the states without a workable standard. Moreover, any definition of "a public
trial" runs the risk of being too inflexible. Defining "public" as the opposite of "secret"
is the narrow view taken by older cases. See Reagan v. United States, 202 Fed. 488,
490 (9th Cir. 1913) ; Benedict v. People, 23 Colo. 126, 46 Pac. 637 (1896) ; Robertson v.
State, 64 Fla. 437, 440, 60 So. 118, 119 (1912). However, some of the more recent cases
have adhered to this narrow view. See Melanson v. O'Brien, 95 F. Supp. 230 (D. Mass.),
vacated on other grounds, 191 F.2d 963 (1st Cir. 1951); Commonwealth v. Blondin,
324 Mass. 564, 87 N.E.2d 455 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 984 (1950). The
"non-secret" rule seemed to imply that as long as the trial was not a Star Chamber
proceeding the constitutional requirement of publicity was satisfied. See Commonweath
v. Blondin, supra at 572, 87 N.E.2d at 460.
Merely allowing a trial by jury does not, standing alone, satisfy the constitutional
definition of a "public trial." See People v. Medcoff, 344 Mich. 108, 73 N.W.2d 537
(1955). But cf. State ex rel. Dressier v. Rigg, 252 Minn. 239, 89 N.W.2d 699 (1958)
(dictum) (post-plea of guilty hearing in chambers).
Until recently there was one situation in which the imposition of summary judgment,
in the presence of only the officers of the court and the grand jury, was the extent of
the defendant's "public" hearing. See Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610 (1960);
FED. R. Crum. P. 42. But this type of secret hearing was declared invalid. See Harris v.
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While the Court has forbidden secret trials, it has not established any
standards under either the sixth or the fourteenth amendment to measure
the extent of the right to a public trial. The absence of such standards has
caused wide diversity in both state and federal decisions." Nearly all courts
have placed some limitations on the right. Which of these limitations, if
any, are violative of the sixth amendment or the due process clause is yet
undetermined. 3
The constitutional requirement of a public trial is primarily to protect
one accused of crime from being unjustly condemned. 4 In public trials,
United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965). For a criticism of the Levine case see The Supreme
Court, 1959 Term, 74 HAtv. L. REv. 97, 144-47 (1960). Similar practices in state
courts have also been overruled. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
Rarely have courts defined "public" in such a manner as to allow admittance of the
public without any restriction. See People v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 243, 37 Pac. 153,
154 (1894); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 491, 62 P.2d 1110, 1115 (1936); State v.
Holm, 67 Wyo. 360, 386, 224 P.2d 500, 509 (1950); 1 COOLLY, CONSTITUTIONAi LimiTA-
TIONS 647 (8th ed. 1927). But see People v. Micalizzi, 223 Mich. 580, 582, 194 N.W.
540, 541 (1923) ; cf. People v. Teitelbaum, 163 Cal. App. 2d 184, 329 P.2d 157 (1958)
(private conferences at bench and in chambers). However, some courts hold that a trial
is not "public" unless all orderly, adult citizens are allowed to attend freely. Wade v.
State, 207 Ala. 1, 92 So. 101 (1921); People v. Yeager, 113 Mich. 228, 71 N.W. 491
(1897) (Youths excluded to protect their morals); Neal v. State, 86 Okla. Crim. 283,
192 P.2d 294 (1948); State ex rel. Varney v. Ellis, 149 W. Va. 525, 142 S.E.2d 63
(1965); accord, Bonicelli v. State, 339 P.2d 1063 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959).
Other courts have said, "The term 'public trial' is used in a relative sense and its
meaning depends largely upon the circumstances of each particular case." People v.
Buck, 46 Cal. App. 2d 558, 562, 116 P.2d 160, 163 (1941); accord, People v. Hall, 51
App. Div. 57, 62, 64 N.Y.S. 433, 436 (1900). [People v. Hall was overruled on other
issues by People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954).]
In conclusion, no definition of "public" can be substituted for legal analysis; none
is completely workable. The test of publicity cannot be based on the number present. See
Keddington v. State, 19 Ariz. 457, 172 Pac. 273 (1918) (no irreducible number exists);
Henderson v. Maxwell, 176 Ohio St. 187, 198 N.E.2d 456 (1964) (no spectators desired
to attend). But see State v. Holm, 67 Wyo. 360, 224 P.2d 500 (1950) (attendance of 35
to 45 people held sufficient).
11. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
However, between these two extremes-the secret trial and the overly public, prejudicial
trial-the Court has chosen to remain silent. See, e.g., Geise v. United States, 158 F.
Supp. 821 (D. Alaska), aff'd, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958), aff'd on rehearing pen
curiam, 265 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959); Commonwealth v.
Blondin, 324 Mass. 564, 87 N.E.2d 455 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 984 (1950).
12. Notes 29-40 infra and accompanying text.
13. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948); State v. Haskins, 38 N.J. Super. 250,
254, 118 A.2d 707, 709 (App. Div. 1955); Quick, supra note 9, at 23; Note 7 W. Ras.
L. Rzv. 78, 83-84 & n.42 (1955).
14. 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 647 (8th ed. 1927).
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defendants are generally said to be benefited by the greater likelihood of
truthful testimony, the more conscientious performance by juries and court
officers,"5 and the possibility of an unknown material witness being among
spectators." Open courts are also said to benefit society as a whole by safe-
guarding against any attempt to employ courts as instruments of oppres-
sion,' by creating public confidence, by educating the public in criminal
justice, and by deterring potential criminals.28
I. PRESENT TREND IN CASES CONCERNING EXCLUSION OF THE
GENERAL PUBLIC
Although there are some minor exceptions,' most of the present problems
raised by the right to a public trial have emerged from two basic factual
patterns."0 These two have in common the fact that the trial usually in-
15. Judges also seem to be aware of the need for open hearings at stages of the
criminal system other than the trial itself. See NEWMAN, CONVICTION 86 (1966). The
pressure exerted by the public on the court often may only be through unfavorable press
coverage. The pressure is, of course, stronger when the judge holds an elective office, but
it is no less real when the ballot box is not the sanction.
16. See 6 WiGzIoRE, op. cit. supra note 7, § 1834; Wiggins, supra note 7, at 27;
Note, 36 ORE. L. REv. 345, 346 (1957). That none of these reasons is valid see Radin,
supra note 7.
17. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).
18. See authorities cited note 16 supra.
19. There have been instances in which the trial was too public. Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
20. In addition, other factual situations have raised the issue of a denial of the right
to a public trial. For example, the accused is not denied a public trial where counsel
for both parties have private conferences at the bench on matters of law. Steiner v.
United States, 134 F.2d 931 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 774 (1943). A public
trial relates to ". . . the impanelment of the jury, the opening statements of counsel, the
presentation of evidence, the arguments, the instructions to the jury and the return of the
verdict. . . ." People v. Teitelbaum, 163 Cal. App. 2d 184, 206-07, 329 P.2d 157, 172
(1958). Thus, a private pre-trial conference or hearing does not abridge the public-trial
right. Hayes v. United States, 296 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1961). Similarly, a post-plea of
guilty hearing held in chambers apparently does not offend the Constitution. See State
ex rel. Dressier v. Rigg, 252 Minn. 239, 89 N.W.2d 699 (1958).
The public has also been excluded during the presentation of certain types of evi-
dence. Iva Ikuko Torguri D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 935 (1952) (evidence by earphones); accord, Lancaster v. United
States, 293 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (per curiam) (excluded public during showing of
obscene film). But see Bonicelli v. State, 339 P.2d 1063 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959)
(reversible error to have private jury hearing of evidentiary tape recording). See also
People v. Montoya, 235 Cal. App. 2d 789, 45 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1965).
The right to a public trial applies to misdemeanors as well as felonies. State v. Moseng,
254 Minn. 263, 95 N.W.2d 6 (1959); State ex rel. Varney v. Ellis, 149 W. Va. 525, 142
S.E.2d 63 (1965). But a hearing on a probation violation is in the nature of a summary
proceeding, entitling no violator to a public hearing. United States v. Hollien, 105 F.
Supp. 987 (W.D. Mich. 1952). Similarly, there is no right to a public trial when the
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volves a crime which has provoked extensive community interest.21 In the
first pattern the trial judge, in the exercise of his discretion, limits the extent
to which the public is permitted to view the proceedings over the defend-
ant's objection. The exclusion order may be directed toward only certain
groups of spectators or may extend to the entire general public; the request
for an exclusion order may come from the prosecutor," the jury, 3 or the
court on its own motion." The second factual situation is one in which the
trial court decides to exclude the entire general public, but the public
through a representative asserts an independent right to attend the trial.25
In this factual pattern the interests of the defendant and those of the com-
munity may come into direct conflict.2" The press, usually a self-appointed
representative of the public, views the exclusion as a violation of the first
amendment freedom of the press. However, in point of fact, even those
cases which recognize the existence of an independent right, vested in the
public, do not consider exclusion orders to be a violation of this freedom.2"
case arises in the land or naval forces of the United States. See Ex parte Benton, 63 F.
Supp. 808 (N.D. Cal. 1945).
There is no denial of the right if no spectators elect to attend. Henderson v. Maxwell,
176 Ohio St. 187, 198 N.E.2d 456 (1964). The same is true if the defendant pleads
guilty. See People v. Henderson, 343 Mich. 465, 72 N.W.2d 177 (1955), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 967 (1956).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949); United Press
Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
22. State v. Schmidt, 139 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 1966). In some situations, the
defendant himself requests the exclusion. State v. White, 97 Ariz. 196, 398 P.2d
903 (1965).
23. State v. Holm, 67 Wyo. 360, 224 P.2d 500 (1950).
24. People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
25. E.g., United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954). See
generally 19 F.R.D. 16 (1955) (panel discussion); 27 CONN. B.J. 239, 242 (1953)
(absolute right theory).
26. United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
27. Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956);
E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896, appeal dismissed per
curiam, 164 Ohio St. 261, 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955). However, the press is normally not
one of the excluded segments of the general public See, e.g., Tanksley v. United States,
145 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1944); State v. Schmidt, 139 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 1966);
State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79 N.E. 462 (1906); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62
P.2d 1110 (1936).
It is not always possible to ascertain whether the exclusion order extended to the press.
See State v. Haskins, 38 N.J. Super. 250, 118 A.2d 707 (App. Div. 1955). When a
blanket exclusion order has been limited in its duration, the press probably has been
excluded. See Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S.W.2d 931 (1935) (everyone ex-
cluded except the jury for ten minutes). The frequency of press exclusions, however, is
difficult to determine because courts rarely have to deal squarely with such exclusions
as a separate issue. See, e.g., People v. Benedict, 23 Colo. 126, 46 Pac. 637 (1896);
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The first section of this note deals with problems raised by exclusion of the
general public over the defendant's objection. The second section examines
case law concerning exclusion orders over the public's objection.
A. Exclusion of the General Public Over Defendant's Objection
A Third Circuit decision of 1949, United States v. Kobli,28 is the land-
mark in the American law of the defendant's right to a public trial. How-
ever, the earlier case law will be discussed first to put Kobli in its proper
perspective.
1. Case Law before United States v. Kobli
Prior to Kobli,29 cases concerning exclusion of the public were hopelessly
in conflict"0 even though a majority of courts purported to follow Professor
Cooley's classic statement on public trials:
It is also requisite that the trial be public. By this is not meant that
every person who sees fit shall in all cases be permitted to attend crimi-
nal trials; because there are many cases where, from the character of
the charge and the nature of the evidence by which it is to be sup-
ported, the motives to attend the trial on the part of portions of the
community would be of the worst character, and where a regard to
public morals and public decency would require that at least the young
be excluded from hearing and witnessing the evidences of human
depravity.... The requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of
the accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not un-
justly condemned, and that the presence of interested spectators may
State v. Nyhus, 19 N.D. 326, 124 N.W. 71 (1909); State v. Osborne, 54 Ore. 289, 103
Pac. 62 (1909).
The press will be excluded when they interfere with a fair trial. Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). But if the press creates
no interference, it is free to print whatever transpires in a judicial proceeding. Phoenix
Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 418 P.2d 594 (Ariz. 1966).
It is further to be noted that the press is not the public's only amicus curiae. See
Beauchamp v. Cahill, 297 Ky. 505, 180 S.W.2d 423 (1944) (attorney excluded). Other
cases have language to this effect:
"[T]he guarantee of a public trial confers no special benefit on the press, the radio indus-
try, or the television industry." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 583 (1965) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring); accord, Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163
(1956); United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954); E. W.
Sripps Co. v. Fulton, supra.
28. 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949).
29. United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949). When Kobli was decided
no trend in the cases was apparent. The decision stimulated case comments. See, eg.,
33 MINN. L. Rxv. 662 (1949); 3 VAND. L. Lv. 125 (1949).
30. For an illustration of the confusion that existed in the case law see the authorities
cited in State v. Haskins, 38 N.J. Super. 250, 118 A.2d 707 (App. Div. 1955).
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keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility... and the
requirement is fairly observed if, without partiality or favoritism, a
reasonable proportion of the public is suffered to attend, notwithstand-
ing that those persons whose presence could be of no service to the
accused, and who would only be drawn thither by a prurient curiosity,
are excluded altogether." (Emphasis added.)
Under this standard, courts applied a type of reasonableness test, 2 under
which an accused had the right to "a reasonable portion of the public"
in attendance at his trial." However, what constituted a "reasonable por-
tion of the public" often varied from court to court.' Cases were often
distinguished on the basis of who was excluded-witnesses, close relatives,
distant relatives, the press, the young, the old, friends of the accused, or
any combination of these. 5 In fact, the authority of a case sometimes rested
on the degree of repulsion created by the crime charged.'" Statutes in some
states which require exclusion of the public from trials involving certain
crimes further complicated this area of the law."r
31. 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 647 (8th ed. 1927). Many courts have
used it as a guide. E.g., People v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 37 Pac. 153 (1894); Robert-
son v. State, 64 Fla. 437, 60 So. 118 (1912); Wendling v. Commonwealth, 143 Ky. 587,
137 S.W. 205 (1911) ; Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 At. 417 (1914) ; State v. Hens-
ley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79 N.E. 462 (1906); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110
(1936) ; People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954) (dissenting opinion). But
see People v. Yeager, 113 Mich. 228, 71 N.W. 491 (1897) (except youthful spectators).
The Yeager opinion is from Cooley's home state, and its major objection is that protection
of public morality is not a sound basis for excluding adults. What is "reasonable" is a
universal standard in the law, but as Cooley uses it, the term may become self-contradic-
tory. First he would require a "reasonable proportion of the public" to safeguard the
principle of publicity, but in the same breath he excludes all prurient-minded. What
he overlooks is that all of the spectators may be prurent-minded to some extent. The
problem of exclusion under the Cooley standard is placed in the hands of the trial judge
with little more to use as a guide than his own personal concepts of morality. The trend
in the case law is that attendance is not to be limited to only a reasonable number and
that public morality can never be the basis for exclusion of the general public. Notes
50-65 infra and accompanying text.
32. Authorities cited in note 31 supra.
33. Beauchamp v. Cahill, 297 Ky. 505, 180 S.W.2d 423 (1944).
34. Compare the results in the cases cited in note 31 supra. For a general treatment of
the conflicts in the earlier case law see BOWERS, JUDICIAL DISCRETION OF TRAL COURTS
§§ 262-69 (1931).
35. To compare these distinctions see the cases cited in the footnotes ill United States
v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949). For a recent case which stretched factual dis-
tinctions to the limit see United States v. Geise, 158 F. Supp. 821 (D. Alaska), aff'd,
262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958), rehearing denied per curiam, 265 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959).
36. See, e.g., Reagan v. United States, 202 Fed. 488 (9th Cir. 1913); Benedict v.
People, 23 Colo. 126, 46 Pac. 637 (1898); State v. Genese, 102 N.J.L. 134, 130 Ati. 642
(Ct. Err. & App. 1925).
37. Thus cases have been determined by the construction of a pertinent statute. See,
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Before Kobli, the confusion among cases dealing with public trials left
three important questions unresolved: (1) whether the protection of pub-
liEc morals justifies the exclusion of the entire general public who are not
involved or interested in the case-including mature adults;"8 (2) whether
e.g., Wade v. State, 207 Ala. 1, 92 So. 101 (1921); Moore v. State, 151 Ga. 648, 108
S.E. 47 (1921), appeal dismissed per curiam, 260 U.S. 702 (1922); Commonwealth v.
Blondin, 324 Mass. 564, 87 N.E.2d 455 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 984 (1950);
People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954); State v. Beckstead, 96 Utah 528,
88 P.2d 461 (1939). But see People v. Yeager, 113 Mich. 228, 71 N.W. 491 (1897).
For a complete list of these statutes, listed by jurisdiction, see 6 WioMORE, EVMDNCE- §
1835 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1964).
A provison of the Alabama constitution reads:
In all prosecutions for rape and assault with intent to ravish, the court may, in its
discretion, exclude from the courtroom all persons, except such as may be nec-
essary in the conduct of the trial.
ALA. CONST. art 6, § 169. When the crime alleged falls into one of these two specific
categories, it is held to be proper in Alabama to exclude the general public. Ex parte
Rudolph, 276 Ala. 392, 162 So. 2d 486 (1964). But in general this provision is narrowly
construed. See, e.g., Hull v. State, 232 Ala. 281, 167 So. 553 (1936) (carnal knowledge
of girl under age twelve); Wade v. State, 207 Ala. 1, 92 So. 101 (1921) (mayhem by
castration). Even when the prosecution was for rape, exclusion of the accused's close
relatives was held to be improper. See Weaver v. State, 33 Ala. App. 207, 31 So. 2d
593 (1947).
Although some courts have given a broad construction to their statutes, these courts
represent a small minority. See Moore v. State, 151 Ga. 648, 108 S.E. 47 (1921),
appeal dismissed per curiam, 260 U.S. 702 (1922) (lacked jurisdiction); Sallie v. State,
155 Miss. 547, 124 So. 650 (1929) (attempted rape). The better view is that these
statutes should be narrowly construed in favor of open courts. People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y.
56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954). At least one court has held an exclusionary statute uncon-
stitutional where it conflicted with the right to a public trial. People v. Yeager, 113 Mich.
228, 71 N.W. 491 (1897). The statute had been passed in an attempt to nullify the
effect of a prior Michigan case that had reversed an exclusion order based on the
protection of public morals. See People v. Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 50 N.W. 995 (1891).
38. Exclusion based on the protection of public morals created a sharp conflict in the
cases. A large group of cases (now a small minority) approved exclusions on this basis.
See Callahan v. United States, 240 Fed. 683 (9th Cir. 1917); Reagan v. United States,
202 Fed. 488 (9th Cir. 1913); Keddington v. State, 19 Ariz. 457, 172 Pac. 273 (1918);
People v. Stanley, 33 Cal. App. 624, 166 Pac. 596 (1917); State v. Johnson, 26 Idaho
609, 144 Pac. 784 (1914) (leading case for this view); State v. Croak, 167 La. 92, 118
So. 703 (1928); State v. Nyhus, 19 N.D. 326, 124 N.W. 71 (1909); Sawyer v. Duffy,
60 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Cal. 1945) (dictum). Another group of cases refused to exclude
the general public on the basis of public morality. See, e.g., Tanksley v. United States,
145 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1944); People v. Byrnes, 84 Cal. App. 2d 72, 190 P.2d 290
(1948); People v. Yeager, 113 Mich. 228, 71 N.W. 491 (1897); State ex rel. Baker v.
Utecht, 221 Minn. 145, 21 N.W.2d 328, cert. denied, 327 U.S. 810 (1946); State v.
Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 156 Pac. 1080 (1916) (leading case for this viewpoint); Rhoades v.
State, 102 Neb. 750, 169 N.W. 433 (1918). These courts reason:
Many other judges have been actuated by the same high motive [to protect public
morals and decency]. The purpose, however, was one which could not be accomp-
lished legally. The public includes persons of all classes. If there were any process
by which any group or groups could be screened out for exclusion solely on the
basis of their ulterior motives in attending the trial, this purpose could not have
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in an appropriate situation for exclusion, the order should be applied indis-
criminately to the general public or be applied only to those specific persons
or groups for whom reasons, particularly applicable to them, exist;39 and
(3) whether the defendant must show actual prejudice because of the ex-
clusion before he has a ground for reversible error.4" Kobli clearly answered
each of these questions."1
2. Kobli: The General Rule
In Kobli, the defendant was charged with violating the Mann Act."' Her
case received considerable notoriety, and on the day of the trial, the court-
room was packed with many young girls. The trial judge gave notice of his
pending exclusion order, and only Kobli objected. Apparently her co-
defendants waived their right to a public trial. 3 The trial court, overruling
Kobli's objection, excluded everyone except defendants, counsel, witnesses
and the press. However, the defendant was extended the privilege to readmit
any particular person she desired to have in attendance."4 On appeal the
been accomplished without depriving the trial of a public character. The exclusion
of the general public upon this ground alone was a violation of the defendant's
constitutional right. People v. Byrnes, 84 Cal. App. 2d 72, 78, 190 P.2d 290, 294
(1948).
39. Often exclusions were indiscriminate. Authorities cited note 38 supra. However,
some courts limited their exclusion to particular persons or groups. See State v. McCool,
34 Kan. 617, 9 Pac. 745 (1886) (women); New York State Licensed Bail Agent's Ass'n v.
Murtagh, 279 App. Div. 851, 110 N.Y.S.2d 154, appeal denied mem., 279 App. Div.
893, 111 N.Y.S.2d 606, appeal denied mem., 303 N.Y. 1009, 106 N.E.2d 284 (1952)
(soliciting bondsmen); Commonwealth v. Principatti, 260 Pa. 587, 104 AtI. 53 (1918)
(other Italians).
40. Prior to Kobli, a minority of cases required that actual prejudice be shown by the
defendant. See Reagan v. United States, 202 Fed. 488 (9th Cir. 1913); Benedict v.
People, 23 Colo. 126, 46 Pac. 637 (1896); State v. Genese, 102 N.J.L. 134, 130 AtI.
642 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925) (by implication); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d
1110 (1936). Reagan and Benedict have been overruled on the requirement of prejudice.
See Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1944); Thompson v. People, 399
P.2d 776 (Colo. 1965); 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 511 (1965). The majority before Kobli
held that prejudice would be implied when the accused was denied a public trial. See,
e.g., Davis v. United States, 247 Fed. 394 (8th Cir. 1917); People v. Hartman, 103 Cal.
242, 37 Pac. 153 (1894); Tilton v. State, 5 Ga. App. 59, 62 S.E. 651 (1908); State v.
Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 156 Pac. 1080 (1916). Some courts, using stronger language, said
that prejudice would be conclusively presumed. People v. Yeager, 113 Mich. 228, 71
N.W. 491 (1897); State v. Osborne, 54 Ore. 289, 103 Pac. 62 (1909).
41. Notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
42. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-22 (1964).
43. United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 868
(1949).
44. This modification, however, was held on appeal not to cure the error caused by
the exclusion because at best the defendant's request could only be for interested parties,
not disinterested members of the general public. United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919,
924 (3d Cir. 1949).
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sole issue was whether it was proper to exclude the adult populace indis-
criminately on the basis of protecting public morals. The court set out the
general rule that in a federal court indiscriminate exclusion of the disin-
terested, adult general public in a criminal case, over the defendant's ob-
jection, is reversible error per se. It went on to say that protection of public
morals alone, though a noble objective, is never a valid reason for excluding
the general adult public:
Moreover whatever may have been the view in an earlier and more
formally modest age, we think that the franker and more realistic atti-
tude of the present day toward matters of sex precluded a determina-
tion that all members of the public, the mature and experienced as
well as the immature and impressionable, may reasonably be excluded
from the trial of a sexual offense upon the ground of public morals.45
However, the court indicated in dictum that exclusion of the general public
for the duration of the testimony of a very young witness would be permis-
sible. 6 The court also ruled that when the right to a public trial has been
violated, prejudice will necessarily be implied; thus, the defendant has no
burden of proving personal detriment. In so holding the court followed
Davis v. United States"7 and Tanksley v. United States.4 The latter case
had expressly overruled the requirement of a showing of actual prejudice
established in Reagan v. United States.4" In further dicta, the court accepted
as standard exceptions to the general rule the propriety of exclusions to
protect courtroom decorum, to prevent overcrowding, and to protect the
morals of the young and immature.
3. Clear Indications of a Trend in Case Law
In the last seventeen years, Kobli has been followed in whole or in part
by most state cases in which the exclusion of the general public has been
in issue."0 One of the earliest cases to express approval of the Kobli ap-
proach was State v. Holm,5 which also expressed approval of a number of
45. Id. at 923.
46. Ibid.
47. 247 Fed. 394 (8th Cir. 1917).
48. 145 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1944).
49. 202 Fed. 488 (9th Cir. 1913).
50. See Sirratt v. State, 240 Ark. 47, 398 S.W.2d 63 (1966); Thompson v. People,
399 P.2d 776 (Colo. 1965); State v. Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 1966); State v.
Haskins, 38 N.J. Super. 250, 118 A.2d 707 (App. Div. 1955); People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y.
56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954); Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958);
Commonwealth ex rel. Paylor v. Cavell, 185 Pa. Super. 176, 138 A.2d 246, cert. denied,
358 U.S. 854 (1958); State v. Holm, 67 Wyo. 360, 244 P.2d 500 (1950).
51. 67 Wyo. 360, 224 P.2d 500 (1950); see Note, 17 Wyo. L.J. 58 (1962). In this
case of first impression, the Wyoming supreme court held that, although the state had
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other approaches. However, contrary to the Kobli rule, the court allowed
a general exclusion order to stand because the trial court had allowed
thirty-five to forty persons, including friends and relatives of the accused,
to be present at the trial. But the court went on to say that in some cases
general public attendance may be mandatory regardless of "the nature of
the case": 52
It may well happen that a person might be arrested and tried for
a crime . . . who has no acquaintenances, no relatives and no friends
in the community. Hence, only the presence of the public generally
could insure him a public trial to which he is rightfully entitled.
In New York, a statute provides that trial judges may exclude the gen-
eral public from trials involving divorce, seduction, abortion, rape, assault
with intent to commit rape, sodomy, bastardy, or filiation. "4 In People v.
Jelke,5" which involved a charge of compulsory prostitution, a New York
trial judge excluded the general public because of the "obscene and sordid
details" in the evidence. The court of appeals, strictly construing the stat-
ute, held that the trial court had no authority to issue a general exclusion or-
der in a case not specified in the statute. Prior to Jelke, New York courts had
applied the Cooley standard in cases not covered by the statute,"6 and the
trial judge's order would have been permissible." However, the majority
in ]elke clearly held that cases not covered by the statute will be governed
by the Kobli principles, which prohibit general indiscriminate exclusions
and require that exclusions be based on reasons particularly applicable to
the class of persons excluded:
The exclusion of particular spectators or classes of spectators may
then be justified, without impairing the essential nature of the trial,
which remains otherwise open to the public at large.5"
The court also followed Kobli in holding that the accused is not required
to show prejudice when the general public has been excluded. There are
no statutory or constitutional provision which specifically guaranteed the right to a public
trial, that right was a part of the common law. Then the court for the first time had to
define a "public trial." The defendant was charged with statutory rape, and because of
"the nature of the case," the general public had been completely excluded.
52. State v. Holm, 67 Wyo. 360, 383, 224 P.2d 500, 508 (1950). The court also
adopted the four standard exceptions from the Kobli opinion.
53. Id. at 387, 224 P.2d at 510.
54. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw § 4.
55. 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
56. People v. Hall, 51 App. Div. 57, 64 N.Y.S. 433 (1900). See generally Note, 6
SYxAcusE L. Rzv. 339 (1954).
57. People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 68, 123 N.E.2d 769, 775 (1954) (dissenting
opinion).
58. Id. at 66, 123 N.E.2d at 774.
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several cases similar to Jelke and Holm in which state courts have also ex-
pressed approval of the Kobli approach. 9
In the two latest state cases dealing with exclusion of the general public-
Thompson v. People" and State v. Schmit 6 -- both the Colorado and the
Minnesota courts followed Kobli without qualification. The Thompson
case overruled an earlier Colorado opinion which followed the Cooley
standard."2 In Schmit, the Minnesota court reasoned that the strong likeli-
hood that the sixth amendment public trial guarantee would be applied to
the states through the due process clause gave "special significance" to fed-
eral cases 63 Since Kobli has clarified and to some extent solidified federal
law in this area,64 it was the obvious case for the Minnesota court to follow,
and it did. In fact, the court in Schmit found that the Kobli rule prohibit-
ing general exclusions based on public morality is now the "majority" rule."5
4. Exceptions to the General Rule
a. standard exceptions. Prior to Kobli, there was general agreement that
in four specific situations part of the public could be excluded from the
courtroom without prejudice to the defendant." Exclusions were permitted
59. Sirratt v. State, 240 Ark. 47, 398 S.W.2d 63 (1966); State v. Haskins, 38 N.J.
Super. 250, 118 A.2d 707 (App. Div. 1955); Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1958); Commonwealth ex rel. Paylor v. Cavell, 185 Pa. Super. 176, 138 A.2d 246,
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 854 (1958).
60. 399 P.2d 776 (Colo. 1965); see 42 DENVER L. CENTER J. 54 (1965).
61. 139 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 1966).
62. Authorities cited note 60 supra. The majority in Thompson attempted unsuccess-
fully to distinguish Benedict. See Benedict v. People, 23 Colo. 126, 46 Pac. 637 (1896).
63. State v. Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 800, 803 (Minn. 1966) ; accord, United States ex rel.
Bruno v. Herold, 246 F. Supp. 363 (N.D.N.Y. 1965).
64. Kobli resolved the conflict over presumed prejudice that had created two lines of
cases.
The Supreme Court has chosen not to review many cases in which a public trial was
an issue. See Quick, A Public Criminal Trial, 60 DicK. L. Rzv. 21, 23 (1955). But see
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). The reason for
this, as it appears in retrospect, may be that Kobli is sound law, and the state courts have
recognized this by adopting the principles of that case. See authorities cited supra note
50. But cf. State v. Meyers, 14 Utah 2d 417, 385 P.2d 609 (1963). A similar self-
restraint was exercised in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), but when this restraint
was unrewarded, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), became necessary.
65. State v. Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Minn. 1966).
66. Similarly, there seems to be general agreement that exclusion is proper in a few
other isolated situations. For example, exclusion may be necessary to protect health.
This situation has not often arisen, but when it has, exclusion has been deemed proper.
People v. Miller, 257 N.Y. 54, 177 N.E. 306 (1931) (to keep courtroom air pure);
Colletti v. State, 31 Ohio Ct. App. 81, 12 Ohio App. 104 (1919) (epidemic); see Com-
monwealth v. Tinkle, 279 Pa. 564, 124 Atl. 191 (1924) (court adjourned to sickroom
of material witness). A related problem is the protection of public safety. See E. W.
Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896, appeal dismissed per curiam,
164 Ohio St. 261, 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955); Makley v. State, 49 Ohio App. 359, 197
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to prevent overcrowding due to the limited physical capacity of the court-
room," to preserve proper order and decorum during the trial,6" to protect
N.E. 339 (1934); State v. White, 97 Ariz. 196, 398 P.2d 903 (1965) (dictum). No case
has arisen on the point, but exclusion would be proper to protect national security. Thus,
earphones have been used for purposes of convenience, but they could be used to protect
secret information. See Iva Ikuko Torguri D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338
(9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 935 (1952); Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d
962 (D.C. Cir. 1950). When national security is at stake, it is not likely that any court
would hesitate to exclude at least the general public to whatever extent necessary to
protect the specific government secret involved. For a more complete discussion of some
of the problems involved in the exclusion of the public from a criminal trial for reasons
based on national security, see Haydock, Some Evidentiary Problems Posed by Atomic
Energy Security Requirements, 61 HARv. L. Rlv. 468, 478-91 (1948).
Exclusion of the public has occurred when necessary "to obtain a fair trial." Trial
courts are said to have the discretion to take whatever steps necessary to provide the
accused with a fair trial. See State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 203 A.2d 1 (1964). Some
concrete situations have occurred in which "obtaining a fair trial" was the main issue.
See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (radio and television equipment prevented
fair trial); People v. Teitelbaum, 163 Cal. App. 2d 184, 329 P.2d 157, cert. denied,
359 U.S. 206 (1958) (matters of law heard in private conferences at the bench) ; People
v. Bernatowicz, 413 Il1. 181, 108 N.E.2d 479 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 928 (1953)
(private conference reviewing defendant's record to determine possible sentence mitiga-
tion); Roberts v. State, 100 Neb. 199, 158 N.W. 930 (1916) (removed trial to public
theater) ; State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 126 S.E.2d 126 (1962) (private computation of
sixty-eight separate indictments); State v. Collins, 50 Wash. 2d 740, 314 P.2d 660 (1957)
(locked courtroom doors to prevent distraction of the jury).
There have been three cases in which obtaining material testimony justified exclusion.
State v. Poindexter, 231 La. 630, 92 So. 2d 390 (1956); People v. Pacuicca, 134
N.Y.S.2d 381 (Bronx County Ct. 1954), aff'd mem., 286 App. Div. 985, 144 N.Y.S.2d
711 (1955) ; Commonwealth v. Principatti, 260 Pa. 587, 104 At. 53 (1918). But see
State v. Velasquez, 76 N.M. 49, 412 P.2d 4 (1966). In State v. Poindexter, the court
held that the defendant was denied a fair trial and that the trial judge had abused his
discretion by refusing to exclude all penitentiary officials. The defendant had been a "trusty
guard" at the prison and was charged with the murder of another "trusty guard." The
inmate who refused to testify until the officials were excluded had heard the deceased vic-
tim threaten the life of the defendant only a few hours before the homicide. In Common-
wealth v. Principatti, the witness was afraid to testify because he feared personal violence
from other Italians in the audience. The court held that it was proper under the circum-
stances to exclude that class of persons. In People v. Pacuicca, the court held that it was
proper to exclude all the spectators during the testimony of a police witness to protect her
future usefulness as a narcotics decoy and to safeguard her life. The reasons for exclusion
in these three cases seem valid if limited to their peculiar factual situations. Each ex-
clusion was limited either to a short time span or to a specific class of persons to whom
particular discretionary reasons applied.
Excluding the public for the purpose of coercing "truthful testimony" is without legal
foundation. E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896, appeal
dismissed per curiam, 164 Ohio St. 261, 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955). But see Radin, The
Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381, 384 & n.6a (1932). It is quite proper to
exclude witnesses other than the one testifying. People v. Martin, 210 Mich. 139, 177
N.W. 193 (1920); Commonwealth v. Turner, 371 Pa. 417, 88 A.2d 915 (1952). See gen-
erally Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 358 (1953).
67. E.g., Wendling v. Commonwealth, 143 Ky. 587, 137 S.W. 205 (1911); State v.
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the morals of youthful spectators when the recital of obviously scandalous
and obscene matters was likely, 9 and to protect a child witnes who had
been the victim of a sex offense. Whenever one of these situations arose,
the trial judge had broad discretion to take whatever protective action was
necessary."'
Dicta in the Kobli opinion unambiguously described and adopted these
four exceptions to the general rule of public attendance."' Today, because
Brooks, 92 Mo. 542, S.W. 257 (1887); Commonwealth v. Trinkle, 279 Pa. 564, 124
Atl. 191 (1924).
68. E.g., United States v. Buck, 24 Fed. Cas. 1289 (No. 14680) (E.D. Pa. 1860)
(oldest federal exclusion case-threatened disturbance concerning a fugitive slave) ; Lide
v. State, 133 Ala. 43, 31 So. 953 (1902); People v. Kerrigan, 73 Cal. 222, 14 Pac. 849
(1887); People v. Santo, 43 Cal. App. 2d 319, 273 P.2d 249 (1954); Stone v.
People, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 326 (1840) (oldest American case on record in which public trial
issue raised); State v. Scruggs, 165 La. 842, 116 So. 206 (1928) (within discretion of
court in murder case); State v. Genese, 102 N.J.L. 134, 130 Atl. 642 (Ct. Err. & App.
1925) (repeated laughter during murder case); see People v. Greeson, 230 Mich. 124,
203 N.W. 141 (1925). Cf. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 583-84 (1965) ; In re Canons of
Judicial Ethics, 132 Colo. 591, 296 P.2d 465 (1956).
If the accused, without restriction, could force the attendance of a noisy, disorderly
multitude or if he could demand that enough space be provided to put the trial on a
theatrical basis-the efficient administration of justice would be hindered. See Kedding-
ton v. State, 19 Ariz. 457, 172 Pac. 273 (1918); Myers v. State, 97 Ga. 76, 25 S.E. 252
(1895) ; Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 387, 91 At. 417, 423 (1914); Roberts v. State,
100 Neb. 199, 158 N.W. 930 (1916); State v. Weldon, 91 S.C. 29, 74 S.E. 43 (1912);
BOWERS, JUDICIAL DISCRETION OF TRAL COURTS § 266 (1931); Radin, supra note 66,
at 397.
69. See Reynolds v. State, 41 Ala. App. 202, 126 So. 2d 497 (1961) (all "children"
under age 14); Milow v. People, 89 Colo. 469, 3 P.2d 1077 (1931) (all under age 18);
State v. Smith, 179 La. 614, 154 So. 625 (1934) (all youth under age 15); State ex rel.
Baker v. Utecht, 221 Minn. 145, 21 N.W.2d 328, cert. denied, 327 U.S. 810 (1946);
State v. Adams, 100 S.C. 43, 84 S.E. 368 (1915) (all Negroes and boys). One recent
case has indicated that the trial court not only has the right, but the duty, to exclude
immature spectators. E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 169, 125 N.E.2d
896, 904, appeal dismissed per curiam, 164 Ohio St. 261, 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955). The
exclusion of youth in the interest of public morals is also supported by considerable dicta.
See, e.g., Wade v. State, 207 Ala. 1, 92 So. 101 (1921) (children of tender age); Tilton
v. State, 5 Ga. App. 59, 62 S.E. 651 (1908) (minors); Rhoades v. State, 102 Neb. 750,
169 N.W. 433 (1918); State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79 N.E. 462 (1906).
In Reynolds v. State, supra, the court held that the dicta in Wade v. State, supra, to
the effect that "children of tender age" could be properly excluded in the interest of
public decency did not include all persons up to age eighteen. The court's reasoning was
that a person of eighteen could serve in the armed forces, could vote in some states, and
could marry without parental consent if a female (in Alabama). The court also indicated
that probably fourteen was the maximum age for the "tender-age" rule.
In a recent case, news media equipment was excluded from the courtroom to protect
youthful morals. Cody v. State, 361 P.2d 307 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961).
70. United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 923 (3d Cir. 1949).
71. See United States ex rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965).
72. This adoption has tended to standardize these exceptions. See authorities cited
note 50 supra.
Washington University Open Scholarship
EXCLUSION OF PUBLIC FROM CRIMINAL TRIALS
of Kobli's increasing prominence these four exceptions carry nearly the
same stamp of authority as the general rule itself.
A frequently advanced argument against these four exceptions is the
"unknown witness" theory." This theory is based on the proposition that
an unknown witness may at any time appear in the courtroom audience
and come forth with material evidence-whether he be youthful, dis-
orderly, or part of an overflow crowd. However, this possibility is largely
theoretical, and there are no recorded cases in which an unknown spec-
tator has stepped from the audience to testify.7" In fact, one author be-
lieves that spectators at most trials are mainly curiosity-seekers."5 Some
courts which approve of the "unknown witness" theory have held none-
theless that the right to a public trial was subject to the four general limi-
tations." In spite of the "unknown witness" objection, the majority of
courts have permitted exclusion in these four specific situations."
b. discretion of the trial judge. From the foregoing discussion it is ap-
parent that the discretion of the trial judge is an important factor in each
of the issues discussed. The vast majority of courts allow the trial judge
nearly complete discretion when the trial situation falls within one of the four
standard exceptions-overcrowding, court decorum, youthful spectators in
morality cases, and the protection of the child witness." In these situations
the judge needs only to be concerned with his duty to provide a fair trial."'
In fact, the abuse of discretion in the first two of these categories is usually
the failure to exclude."0
By contrast, exclusion based on the protection of adult morality has in the
past been a frequent source of abuse."' As discussed earlier, the view of the
modem courts is, with the exception of youthful spectators, to take morality-
based exclusions out of the realm of discretion. 2 This view is based on the
73. See United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 923 (3d Cir. 1949) ; Tanksley v. United
States, 145 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1944); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 583 (1965) (Warren,
C.J., concurring); 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834 (3d ed. 1940).
74. The only case cited by Wigmore in which the theory proved correct was a case
in which the material witness was a newspaper reader, not a casual spectator. See 6
WioMoRE, op. cit. supra note 73, at § 1834.
75. Radin, supra note 66, at 393.
76. United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 923-24 (1949); State v. Schmit, 139
N.W.2d 800, 803-04 (Minn. 1966).
77. See United States v. Kobli, supra note 76, at 922.
78. For an excellent example of discretion properly exercised see Milow v. People, 89
Colo. 469, 3 P.2d 1077 (1931).
79. The trial judge is not personally liable to any excluded spectator. Williamson v.
Lacy, 86 Me. 80, 29 Ad. 943 (1893).
80. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
81. See United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949); People v. Jelke, 308
N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
82. See cases cited note 50 supra.
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proposition that a trial judge is not the conservator of public morality."a
Though denied his former role as the protector of public morality, the trial
judge today still exercises much discretion through the standardized ex-
clusion rules. To avoid abuses of this discretion, the trial record should
clearly specify (1) the number present, (2) whether the general public was
present, and (3) the circumstances and reasons for any exclusion. The
record should also clarify whether the reasons for excluding particular classes
were limited to the four standard exceptions.8 4
B. Does the Public Have an Independent Right to Attend Criminal Trials?
Instead of objecting, the defendant may, with the aid of counsel, decide
to waive his right to a public trial."s When an accused decides to waive his
right because exclusion will afford a better opportunity for a fair trial, the
question may arise whether the public has an independent right to attend
criminal trials regardless of the defendant's view of his best interests."0 A
court's opinion of the primary purpose of the public trial guarantee will, of
course, influence its decision on this question. 7 A few modern courts have
83. State v. Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 1966).
84. See State ex rel. Baker v. Utecht, 221 Minn. 145, 149, 21 N.W.2d 328, 331, cert.
denied, 327 U.S. 810 (1946).
85. See Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956).
However, this right to waive can be abused. A defendant has no right to a private
hearing just to get the "truth" out of a witness through coercion. See E. W. Scripps Co.
v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896, appeal dismissed per curiam, 164 Ohio
St. 261, 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
The harbinger of the right to waive a public trial was Patton v. United States, 281
U.S. 276 (1930). There the court held that since a defendant could plead guilty and
thus effectively waive any trial at all, he could also waive his right to a trial by jury. Some
courts have apparently applied the same reasoning to the right to a public trial. The right
to waive a public hearing seems well established. See, e.g., United States v.
Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 868 (1949); Keddington v.
State, 19 Ariz. 457, 172 Pac. 273 (1918); People v. Tugwell, 32 Cal. App. 520, 163
Pac. 508 (1917); Commonwealth ex rel. Paylor v. Cavell, 185 Pa. Super. 176, 138
A.2d 246, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 854 (1958). The defendant need not personally waive
his right. United States v. Sorrentino, supra; People v. Cash, 52 Cal. 2d 841, 345 P.2d
462 (1959). Similarly, the defendant can usually waive his right to a public hearing by
his failure to make a timely objection. State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110
(1936); State v. Collins, 50 Wash. 2d 740, 314 P.2d 660 (1957); accord, People v.
Teitelbuam, 163 Cal. App. 2d 184, 329 P.2d 157, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 206 (1958). But
see Wade v. State, 207 Ala. 1, 92 So. 101 (1921); State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79
N.E. 462 (1906). The waiver must, however, be an expression of intelligent acquiescence.
United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 246 F. Supp. 363 (N.D.N.Y. 1965).
86. See Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956);
United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954); E. W. Scripps Co.
v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896, appeal dismissed per curiam, 164 Ohio
St. 261, 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
87. Most courts hold that the purpose of a public trial is to benefit the defendant.
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construed language from earlier opinions to mean that the public has such
a right."8 However, that language is often a mere expression of the histori-
cal basis and importance of open courts, not an attempt to create for the
public an independently vested right to attend."s In E. W. Scripps Co. v.
Fulton," one such modern case, the court held that a defendant has the
right to waive a public trial, but in the same opinion this waiver was held
to have no effect when the public asserts an independent right to attend."
One author has noted that such a holding is unfair to the accused:
The somewhat anomalous result is that the defendant may waive
his right to the extent of foreclosing the issue of public trial upon ap-
E.g., Geise v. United States, 265 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 842 (1959); United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 868 (1949) ; Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 583-85 (1965) (concurring opinion) ;
accord, Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 153 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Pa. 1957),
aff'd, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958); Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 At. 312
(1927) ; see Keddington v. State, 19 Ariz. 457, 172 Pac. 273 (1918) ; cf. Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); In re Canons of Judicial Ethics, 132 Colo. 591, 296 P.2d
465 (1956) ; People v. Harris, 302 Ill. 590, 135 N.E. 75 (1922). But see State v. Copp,
15 N.H. 212, 215 (1844); Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958); cf.
In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 34 Pac. 227 (1893). The opinions which discuss the
purpose of a public trial in terms of the interests of both the public and the individual
have led to confusion. See State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 218-19, 156 Pae. 1080, 1083-
84 (1916); State v. Holm, 67 Wyo. 360, 387, 224 P.2d 500, 510 (1950). An example of
such confusion is found in the ambiguity of:
* . . the accused may waive a constitutional right or privilege designed for his pro-
tection where no question of public policy is involved. . . . That the courts of
Oklahoma be open to every person is a matter of public policy. (Emphasis added).
Lyles v. State, supra at 740.
Even those who most strongly favor an independent public right concede that, "the
accused's right to a public trial is a part of his broad right to a fair trial." Note, 31
IND. L.J. 377, 381 (1956); cf. State ex rel. Dressler v. Rigg, 252 Minn. 239, 89 N.W.2d
699 (1958).
88. See Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956);
E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896, appeal dismissed per
curiam, 164 Ohio St. 261, 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
Although never discussed by courts, the ninth amendment of the Constitution could
lend some support to the independent right theory. There has been considerable discus-
sion of whether the public's right to attend is a right which is distinct from the accused's
right. See, e. g., Quick, supra note 64, at 29-35; Note, 31 IND. L.J. 377, 381-82 (1956);
7 WAsH. & LE L. REv. 193 (1950). It must be noted that when this independent right
is asserted, the press is not held to be the exclusive representative of the public. E.g.,
Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, supra. But see Sullivan, The 'Public' Interest in Public
Trial, 25 PA. B.A.Q. 253 (1954).
89. See United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
90. 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896, appeal dismissed per curiam, 164 Ohio St.
261, 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
91. Id. at 167, 125 N.E.2d at 903. For comprehensive coverage of the defendant's
right to waive a public trial see Note, 36 ORF. L. Ray. 345 (1957).
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peal and yet gain nor [sic] corresponding benefit of having the curiosity-
seeking public excluded from the courtroom. 2 (Emphasis original.)
In Kirstowsky v. Superior Court,93 the defendant was charged with mur-
dering her husband. As part of her defense, it was necessary for her to tes-
tify, in her own behalf, as to abnormal sexual practices that had been forced
upon her. She waived her right to a public hearing of her testimony be-
cause the details were alleged to be prejudicial to her, and because the
thought of making a public disclosure of the sordid details had disturbed
her emotionally to the point that she could no longer adequately assist in
her own defense. The trial court granted the motion. The excluded news-
paper corporations brought a writ of mandate against the trial court to
vacate the exclusion order. The question was moot by the time a final
judgment was rendered because the criminal trial itself had already termi-
nated. Nevertheless, the court laid down the applicable principles. If, as
under the facts of the case, the exclusion was necessary to insure the accused
a fair trial, the trial court could properly exclude the entire public from such
portion of the trial as was necessary. Thus, it would have been proper to
exclude everyone during this defendant's testimony, but the trial court's
extension of the exclusion to the entire trial was held to have been improper.
The alternative rule given by the court was that, when the issue of a fair
trial is not involved, the mere waiver by a defendant of his right to a public
trial does not justify exclusion of the general public.
In People v. Jelke,9" the trial judge on his own motion and over the de-
fendant's objection excluded all segments of the general public. Jelke was
convicted, but even before he could take an appeal, a number of newspaper
publishers had not only proceeded against the trial judge by an action in
the nature of a writ of prohibition to restrain the execution of the exclusion
order but had also effected an appeal.9" The result of this appeal was the
leading case, United Press Ass'ns v. Valente." The New York court held
that while the public has a legitimate "interest in seeing that every person
accused of crime shall have a fair trial,""7 this interest does not achieve the
status of a vested right which can be independently asserted:
It is for the defendant alone to determine whether, and to what ex-
tent, he shall avail himself of [his right to a public trial].... The pub-
92. Id. at 354.
93. 143 Cal App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956).
94. 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
95. Final decision on their case was delayed until Jelke had perfected his own appeal.
United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
96. Ibid. The case has been noted. 53 MicH. L. Rnv. 995 (1955).
97. United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 80, 123 N.E.2d 777, 780 (1954).
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lic's interest is adequately safeguarded as long as the accused himself
is given the opportunity to assert on his own behalf, in an available
judicial forum, his right to a trial that is fair and public.9
The court further stated that if the petitioners were correct in their assertion
of the existence of an independent right, then any time any individual de-
manded that a court be kept open, the court would be powerless to promote
a fair trial by excluding certain segments of the public. Not only would
such a right flood the courts "with a host of collateral proceedings," but
to recognize an independent right would be
To permit outsiders to interfere with the defendant's own conduct
of his defense...
Still another strange consequence of the petitioners' position would
be to permit the defendant's rights to be determined in proceedings in
which he was not a party and had no voice, as exemplified by the very
case before us.'
II. C rrIpuF,
A. Status of Kobli
1. In General
Of the two basic factual patterns, the Kobli pattern seems to involve a
more nearly settled area of law than that developed to support an inde-
pendent right in favor of the general populace. In the future, Kobli will
likely be the leading case on exclusion of the public in criminal trials at
least until the Supreme Court decides to define a "public trial" in more
precise terms. Thus, Cooley's famous statement is significant today only
insofar as it recognizes that the benefit of a public trial is primarily for the
accused. An important reason for Kobli's growing prominence is that its
principles are relatively easy to administer. The conclusive presumption of
prejudice which arises when the general public is excluded means that this
issue will not have to be litigated. Because Kobli eliminated protection of
adult morality as a basis for exclusion and rejected any type of reasonable-
ness test, courts following it need only determine whether the general, dis-
interested public was permitted to attend. Thus, such courts need not con-
98. id. at 81, 123 N.E.2d at 780-81.
99. Id. at 81, 123 N.E.2d at 780.
100. Id. at 83, 123 N.E.2d at 782. This would have been the result if the court had
not delayed its decision. Accord, Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745,
300 P.2d 163 (1956) (mandamus); E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157,
125 N.E.2d 896, appeal dismissed per curiam, 164 Ohio St. 261, 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955)
(writ of prohibition).
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sider unimportant factual distinctions or list exactly who was in attend-
ance.
10°
The premise on which the Kobli principles rest is that a trial with friends,
relatives, bar members, and reporters attending is simply not the same as
one in "which the public is free to attend."'' Newsmen, with their some-
times "blas6 professional" attitudes,03 may overlook acts of judicial oppres-
sion or prejudice. Members of the bar, relatives, and friends are not likely
"to represent or speak for the entire community interest"'0 4 and thus are
less likely to influence the court toward a fair administration of justice. In
short, the constitutional provision can provide an accused with all possible
benefits which a public trial was meant to bestow only when the general
public is also in attendance.
2. The Problem of the Child Witness
In the vast majority of jurisdictions, a standard exception to the general
rule of publicity permits the blanket exclusion of the public during the testi-
mony of a child witness who was the victim of a sex offense.' For several
reasons, however, the validity of this exclusion is doubtful when the de-
fendant objects.'
101. See Sirratt v. State, 240 Ark. 47, 398 S.W.2d 63 (1966); Thompson v. People,
399 P.2d 776 (Colo. 1965); State v. Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 1966); State v.
Haskins, 38 N.J. Super. 250, 118 A.2d 707 (App. Div. 1955); People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y.
56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954); Lyles v State, 330 P.2d 734 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958);
Commonwealth ex rel. Paylor v. Cavell, 185 Pa. Super. 176, 138 A.2d 246, cert. denied,
358 U.S. 854 (1958); State v. Holm, 67 Wyo. 360, 224 P.2d 500 (1950). The groups
excluded may, however, have to be listed to demonstrate that they fall within one of the
standard exceptions. See notes 66-72 supra and accompanying text.
102. State v. Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 800, 806 (Minn. 1966).
103. United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 923 (3d Cir. 1949).
104. State v. Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 800, 806 (Minn. 1966).
105. See, e.g., Reagan v. United States, 202 Fed. 488 (9th Cir. 1913); United States
v. Geise, 158 F. Supp. 821 (D. Alaska), aff'd, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958), rehearing
denied per curiam, 265 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959); Hogan
v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S.W.2d 931 (1935); State ex rel. Baker v. Utecht, 221 Minn.
145, 21 N.W.2d 328, cert. denied, 327 U.S. 810 (1946); State v. Datum, 62 S.D. 123,
252 N.W. 7 (1933). But see People v. Yeager, 113 Mich. 228, 71 N.W. 491 (1897);
Rhoades v. State, 102 Neb. 750, 169 N.W. 433 (1918).
However, less protection is afforded the adult witness than the child witness. See,
e.g., Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1944); State v. Callahan, 100
Minn. 63, 70, 110 N.W. 342, 345 (1907) (dissenting opinion). But see Kirstowsky v.
Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956); Dutton v. State, 123 Md.
373, 91 Atl. 417 (1914). The conclusion of the dissenting judge in State v. Callahan,
supra, seems undeniable: "I do not find anything in the Constitution which justifies
the court in holding that the constitutional right to a public trial is to be measured by
the degree of nervousness of a susceptible complaining witness."
106. In light of the numerous problems raised by the exclusion of the public during
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One cause for doubt is the weak justification advanced for this exception.
Though framed in austere and conservative legal terminology, this justifi-
cation is largely based on the general repulsion which our society has for
sex offenses against young girls. Suffering embarrassment, which may range
from mere discomfort and shame before a strange crowd to complete inco-
herence and hysteria, a young sex-offense victim presents a truly pathetic
picture to the court and calls for the utmost sympathy. A few courts have
been candid and have admitted their aversion to the hardship placed on
... the unfortunate girl who was called upon to testify to the story of the
defendant's crime and her shame."' 7 However, courts normally have said
that the exclusion is necessary to prevent a "miscarriage of justice."' 8 Of
course, "miscarriage of justice" could simply mean that it is unjust to force
such a helpless witness to publicly display her shame and to subject herself
to the indirect punishment of great discomfort, which possibly could lead
to psychological deterioration. Similarly, this phrase could mean that it
would be unjust to release one "guilty" of crime merely because the only
evidence available was from a witness who, for emotional reasons, was un-
able to testify. Conceivably, the phrase could mean that the trial judge
believes the defendant could not receive a fair trial unless the public is
excluded. But if an exclusion is made over the defendant's objection, the
trial judge has simply substituted his judgment for that of the defendant.
The prevention of a "miscarriage of justice," if construed as favoring the
defendant, can at best mean that an accused will obtain the benefit of the
calm and solemnity which accompany a relatively private hearing of testi-
mony. On the other hand, the exclusion may be detrimental to an accused
by drawing attention to the heinous nature of the crime and by arousing
sympathy for the victim and indignation toward the defendant. 9 Further-
more, some members of the jury may erroneously conclude that since the
witness needs protection, her story must be true, or that since the defendant
does not need publicity to disprove the testimony his innocence is to be
the testimony of a child witness, it is unfortunate that the Supreme Court has not
chosen to give this problem further analysis. One recent denial of review was United
States v. Geise, 158 F. Supp. 821 (D. Alaska), aff'd, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958),
rehearing denied per curiam, 265 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959).
107. Reagan v. United States, 202 Fed. 488, 490 (9th Cir. 1913); accord, Dutton v.
State, 123 Md. 373, 387, 91 At. 417, 423 (1914).
108. United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949) ; Commonwealth v. Blondin,
324 Mass. 564, 87 N.E.2d 455 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 984 (1950); State v. Holm,
67 Wyo. 360, 224 P.2d 500 (1950).
109. See Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58, 59 (9th Cir. 1944) (rape of adult
married woman but reasoning should apply to child witness); Quick, A Public Criminal
Trial, 60 Dxcx. L. REv. 21, 28 (1955).
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doubted' 1 Since few courts have ever discussed either the basic merits of
affording a youthful witness such protection or its effect on the accused,111
the rationale for this exclusion must be more carefully examined in the
future.
1 12
A second reason for questioning the validity of exclusions of the public for
child witnesses is the high probability that the testimony may be false. The
falsity of youthful testimony is more difficult to detect than its adult counter-
part because immature speech patterns disarm suspicions. Furthermore,
young witnesses in sex offense cases often believe that the false accusations
are actually true.' Although no empirical studies are available which sub-
110. Ibid.
111. See cases cited note 105 supra. But see Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 387, 91
Ad. 417, 423 (1914).
112. This note does not attempt to deny the basic merits of the need for protecting
witnesses of tender years. Often the shock of a heinous sexual offense against one's person
(at that age) will have lifelong effects, and assuming an offense has in fact been com-
mitted, the additional shock of having to testify to it publicly may be the personal break-
ing point for some individuals. Though no empirical courtroom studies have been made,
testifying publicly may destroy any formerly-created denial or defense mechanisms which
had mitigated the emotional damage of the original offensive act. See generally HALL, A
PRIMER oF FREUDIAN PSYCHOLOGY (1954). However, without castigating the rights of
the particularly vulnerable witness to protection through exclusion, this note is attempting
to make clear the defendant's position. He stands innocent until proven guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. See generally Annot., 34 A.L.R. 938 (1925); MCCorMICnC, EvI-
DENCE § 321 (1954). The official act of exclusion in favor of the child witness may
lessen the presumption of innocence in the eyes of the jury.
113. False accusations in sex cases are made for a variety of reasons. See PLoscowE,
SEX AND THE LAW 187-90 (1951); 3 WiozsoR, EvIDENCE § 924a (3d ed. 1940).
Ploscowe notes the paucity of cases that have recognized this danger of falsity. Wigmore
explains the problem in this way:
Modem psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of errant young girls and
women coming before the courts . . . . Their psychic complexes are multifarious,
distorted partly by inherent defects, partly by diseased derangements or abnormal
instincts, partly by bad social environment, partly by temporary physiological or
emotional conditions. One form taken by these complexes is that of contriving
false charges of sexual offenses by men. . . .[These take expression] in the narration
of imaginary sex-incidents of which the narrator is the heroine or the victim. On
the surface the narration is straightforward and convincing. The real victim, how-
ever, too often in such cases is the innocent man; for the respect and sympathy
naturally felt by any tribunal for a wronged female helps to give easy credit to
such a plausible tale.
* . * But the lamentable thing is that the orthodox rules of Evidence in most
instances prevent adequate probing of the testimonial mentality of a woman-wit-
ness .... Judging merely from the reports of cases in the appellate courts, one must
infer that many innocent men have gone to prison because of tales whose falsity
could not be exposed.
Id. at 459; see Quick, supra note 109, at 26.
Statutes requiring corroboration of the youthful victim's testimony may be one solution.
See N.Y. PEN. LAw § 2013. But in the absence of a statute, the law in the vast major-
ity of states is that no corroboration is required. Annot., 60 A.L.R. 1124 (1929). For the
Canadian view and experience in this area see Cartwright, The Prospective Child Witness,
6 CriuM. L.Q. 196 (1963); Savage, Corroboration in Sexual Offenses, 6 Clams. L.Q. 282
(1964); Savage, Corroboration, 6 CRw. L.Q. 159 (1963).
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stantiate the proposition that open hearings will insure a greater likelihood
of truthful testimony," 4 certainly, private hearings of morality offenses make
perjury easier." 5 In terms of the truthful prosecutrix, however, mandatory
public trials could mean that fewer of these crimes will be reported. A young
sex offense victim may rather see her attacker go free than suffer the humilia-
tion resulting from public exposure of the sordid details of the crime. This
may be the price of the sixth amendment.
The inherent weakness of the defendant's position in sex offense cases
is another reason for doubting the validity and fairness of the exclusion."'
In these cases the evidence often consists only of a suspect's word against
that of his accuser, and the jury is, of course, very sympathetic toward the
latter. Sir Matthew Hale has described the problem:
[T]he heinousness of the offense many times transporting the judge
and jury with so much indignation that they are overhastily carried
to the conviction of the person accused thereof by the confident testi-
mony, sometimes of malicious and false witnesses."'
The presence of the general public during a victim's testimony could allow
objective observers to expose blatant partialities and to criticize obvious
weaknesses in the child's story which might otherwise remain unquestioned.
Confronted with this dilemma, the decision of exclusion should be governed
by the defendant's best interests and rarely granted over his objection.
The decision to exclude the public could involve an attempt to balance
the fairness to a defendant against the need for protecting a young witness.
However, her suffering is usually temporary, whereas the defendant's con-
viction will result in irreparable damage. It cannot be denied that a witness
of tender years should be allowed some protection,"5 but because of the
extreme danger of prejudice from exclusion orders, some safeguards should
114. Even public testimony may produce false accusations. See GILES-JOHNSON DE-
FENSZ COMM., DOCUMENTARY OF A CAPITAL CRIM. PROCEEDING: THE GILES-JOHNSON
CASE (1964).
115. There are a few studies of individual cases which indicate that public attendance
would create a greater likelihood of truthful testimony. See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
924a (3d ed. 1940).
116. As Dr. William A. White has said:
Many well known cases which have . . . resulted in mob violence have indicated
... the extreme prejudice which may be mobilized against an accused person, often
quite without anything that could be properly called adequate evidence .... These
facts make the whole situation one which needs to be surrounded by as many safe-
guards as possible....
3 WIoOR, EVIDENCE § 924a, at 465 (3d ed. 1940).
117. PLOSCOWE, op. cit. supra note 113, at 188.
118. See note 112 supra.
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be annexed to insure a fair trial."' The author suggests the following safe-
guards: (1) The maximum duration of the exclusion should be the duration
of the testimony of the particular witness to be protected. 2 ' (2) Any such
witness, in order to be entitled to a relatively private hearing of her testi-
mony, should submit to a pre-trial psychiatric examination. 2 Wigmore
declares, "No judge should ever let a sex-offense charge go to the jury unless
the female complainant's social history and mental makeup have been exam-
ined and testified to by a qualified physician."1 22 (3) The report of the
examination should be testified to in open court; exclusion should be granted
only when experts, independently selected by the court, decide that the
potential witness is not suffering from any personality complexes which
might affect the truthfulness of her testimony or which might cause her
to suffer serious psychological damage if she is required to testify publicly.
(4) If exclusion is granted contrary to the advice of psychiatrists, then the
119. Cf. Schatkin, Should Paternity Cases be Tried in a Civil or Criminal Court?, 1
CRim. L. REv. (N.Y.) 18, 23-24 (1954).
120. See, e.g., Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S.W.2d 931 (1935); State v. Damm,
62 S.D. 123, 252 N.W. 7 (1933). In both these cases the duration was correct, but the ex-
clusion order was too broad in its scope.
121. Only one case has considered this limitation; it rejected any such restriction. See
Wedmore v. State, 237 Ind. 212, 143 N.E.2d 649 (1957). The court said:
We do not believe this court has the power or authority to require the State to sup-
port the testimony of a prosecuting witness in a sex case by requiring her to submit
to a psychiatric examination, the report of which is to be presented in evidence, in
order to sustain a conviction.
Id. at 223, 143 N.E.2d at 654. However, this was not an exclusion case.
The form of the examination may vary if the witness is too young to take an oath.
122. 3 WIOmORE, EvmFNcn § 924a, at 460 (3d ed. 1940). (All italicized in ori-
ginal.)
Wigmore draws his conclusions from the commentary and extensive research of psy-
chiatrists who have observed this type of false testimony over a lifetime of clinical work.
Dr. W. F. Lorenz summarized the type of authority which supports Wigmore's view:
We, who have had extensive criminal experience among the mentally ill, know
how frequently sexual assault is charged or claimed with nothing more substantial
supporting this belief than an unrealized wish or unconscious, deeply suppressed
sex-longing. . . . I, therefore, believe that while psychiatric examination is de-
sirable in all criminal cases, it is imperative in every case where sexual assault is
charged.
Nor should the comparative youth or apparent helplessness of the accuser be in
itself a presumptive circumstance to support the charges. I have known of hysterical
girls of twelve years and less to live through a fantastic sex drama that would be
credible imagination for a playwright. In short, I recommend a thorough psychia-
tric examination; by which I mean an all-inclusive survey of the individual, her
physical and mental make-up, her adjustments, aims and interests, as all of these
are pertinent... to develop the truth.
3 WIOGMOR, EviDE cE § 924a, at 465 (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore also notes that the
American Bar Association's Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence ap-
proved his position by a vote of 47 to 2. Id. at 466.
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court must not "deprive the accused of the right to have his family and
friends present as well as a reasonable portion of the public." 123
B. Independent Right Theory
Since only three cases have dealt with the independent right problem, and
since each one of these offered a different solution, the law in this area is not
settled. United Press Ass'ns v. Valente,"24 which denies the existence of a
right distinct and independent of the defendant's right to a public trial,
appears to be the better view. Even if the existence is conceded, the right
is posssed by the public as a whole,12' and to give any individual member
of the public sufficient standing to assert the independent right would be to
overburden the courts with collateral appeals and to prejudice the defendant
by converting a constitutional privilege into an imperative requirement.'
Valente provides a workable standard. By contrast, Kirstowsky v. Superior
Court12 is too ambivalent; it seems to put the burden on the defendant to
demonstrate that, because of the potential prejudice to him through gen-
eral attendance of the public, exclusion pursuant to his waiver is warranted.
E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton"12 ignores the defendant's best interests and
therefore reaches an untenable result.
While it is true that a defendant has no right to a secret trial,"' he should
be able to restrict attendance to an extent sufficient to secure a jury verdict
uninfluenced by the prejudice of observers."' The benefits to society de-
rived from open courts will not be diminished if the concept of an inde-
pendent public right to attend criminal trials is rejected. It is hard to
imagine how exclusion of segments of the general public in certain cases
would nullify any of those benefits listed earlier -protection against the use
of oppressive tactics by courts, building of public confidence in the court
system, deterrence of potential criminals, or education of the public in crimi-
123. Beauchamp v. Cahill, 297 Ky. 505, 508, 180 S.W.2d 423, 424 (1944).
(Emphasis added.)
124. 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
125. Id. at 84-85, 123 N.E.2d at 783.
126 United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721, 723 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
868 (1949).
127. 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956).
128. 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896, appeal dismissed per curiam, 164 Ohio St.
261, 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
129. State v, White, 97 Ariz. 196, 398 P.2d 903 (1965); Singer v. United States,
380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965) (dictum); see Green v. State, 135 Fla. 17, 184 So. 504 (1938);
State v. Hashimoto, 47 Hawaii 185, 389 P.2d 146 (1963).
130. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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nal law. In fact, a defendant's realization of a fair trial, which is clearly
society's greatest benefit, will be enhanced by rejection of the independent
right theory. Though under normal circumstances the public should be able
to attend, little justice is given the accused or the public as a whole when
the privilege of a public trial is converted into an "imperative require-
ment."'' Furthermore, the decision to exclude certain portions of the pub-
lic on request of a defendant is within the discretion of the trial judge,"2
who is likely to consider the interests of the public in reaching his conclu-
sion.'33 Even when an exclusion order is granted, impartial observers will
probably be present since an accused clearly cannot demand a private trial.
131. United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721, 723 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
868 (1949).
132. Green v. State, 135 Fla. 17, 184 So. 504 (1938); State v. Hashimoto, 47 Hawaii
185, 389 P.2d 146 (1963); Note, 36 ORE. L. REv. 345, 350 (1957).
133. See, e.g., E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896, appeal
dismissed per curiam, 164 Ohio St. 261, 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955); cf. NEWMIAN, CON-
VICTION 86 (1966) (impact of public criticism). But see United States ex rel. Bruno v.
Herold, 246 F. Supp. 363, 367 (N.D.N.Y. 1965) (public trial right belongs only to the
accused).
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